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It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you in trouble. It’s 
what you know for sure that just ain’t so. – Josh Billings. 
There is no such thing as free lunch. – Milton Friedman. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the moderation role of market structure on the relationship between 
operational performance and firms’ costs composition. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
were adopted as proxy for market structure; for operational performance, Return on Invested 
Capital (ROIC); and for firms’ cost choices, the Degree of Operating Leverage (DOL). The 
database covers non-financial firms at Brazilian market from 1996 to 2016, third quarter. The 
output points toward to market structure moderation of the relationship between ROIC and 
DOL with an increase of the effect when markets comes near to a monopolistic structure. 
Overall results suggests the existence of a relation between firms’ operational performance and 
cost behavior, indicated by a negative relationship between ROIC and DOL. Furthermore, we 
notice a moderating role of Size on market structure (HHI) moderation role on the relationship 
between ROIC and DOL, in the extent that market structure moves towards a higher 
concentration level configuration, the moderating effect of HHI becomes more latent. 
 
Keywords: Degree of Operating Leverage. Return On Invested Capital. Market Structure. Size, 
Moderation.  
RESUMO 
Esta dissertação investiga o papel de moderação da estrutura de mercado na relação entre 
desempenho operacional e composição dos custos das empresas. Como proxy para a estrutura 
de mercado, adotou-se o Índice Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI); para o desempenho operacional, 
foi utilizado como proxy o retorno sobre o capital investido (ROIC); e para composição dos 
custos das empresas, o Grau de Alavancagem Operacional (DOL). A base de dados abrange 
empresas não financeiras no mercado brasileiro de 1996 a 2016, terceiro trimestre. Resultados 
apontam que a estrutura de mercado modera a relação entre ROIC e DOL, tendo maior efeito 
há medida que os mercados se aproximam de uma estrutura monopolística. Resultados em 
geral, sugerem a existência de relação entre o desempenho operacional das empresas e 
comportamento dos custos, indicado por uma relação negativa entre ROIC e DOL. Observa-se, 
também, um papel moderador significativo do Tamanho na função de moderação da estrutura 
de mercado (HHI) na relação entre ROIC e DOL, na medida em que a estrutura do mercado 
avança para configurações próximas do monopólio, o efeito moderador HHI torna-se mais 
latente. 
 
Palavras-chave: Grau de Alavancagem Operacional. Retorno no capital investido. Estruturas 
de mercado. Tamanho. Moderação. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This research examines the moderating role of market structure on the relationship between 
firm operational performance and the cost structure, using return on invested capital (ROIC) as 
proxy for firm operational performance and the degree of operating leverage (DOL) as proxy 
for cost behavior, for non-financial Brazilian public firms.  
Financial performance has nonfinancial measures as leading indicators and it justifies their use 
as measure of performance evaluation (BANKER; MASHRUWALA, 2007), we adopt the 
Cost-Volume-Profit (CVP) approach, according to the neoclassical economic theory of markets 
at equilibrium (FRANÇA; LUSTOSA, 2011; LUSTOSA; FRANÇA, 2012). We follow 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Tabak and Guerra (2007), Dantas, Medeiros and Lustosa (2006) 
using the DOL  as a metric of firm operating risk to study the Brazilian market and Simons 
(1999) using ROIC as proxy for operational performance. 
We found that market structure moderates the relation between DOL and ROIC when 
competition level decreases. However, DOL responds to operational performance in our sectors 
independently of the sectors competition level. The introduction of Size as a moderating 
variable of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) moderating role, also aligns with the Porter 
(1979) and Marcus (1969) findings that indicates the importance of analyzing the size impact 
on profitability of firms within an industry. 
The traditional CVP analysis derives from the economic optimization concept under 
uncertainty. Based on the premise that Marginal Costs (MC) and Marginal Revenues (MR) are 
only impacted by Fixed Costs (FC) on the short run, the CVP analysis allows to build the idea 
of Contribution Margin (CM), which means the difference between price and variable costs 
(ADAR; BARNEA; LEV, 1977).  
The management accounting literature views the firm’s profit maximization through production 
approach, without consider exchange and consumption problems, at least for items that are not 
of first-order concern. Markets that tend to equilibrium reduce the role of the management in 
generating greater profits, since there is no economic profit at perfectly competitive markets. 
Under this perspective, management researchers focus their effort to a partial equilibrium 
orientation (BROMWICH, 2006). On the other hand, DOL implicitly accepts a perfect and 
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complete market as main economic environment and model relies on the premise that firms 
operate in a perfect competition or monopolistic market (KARNANI, 1983). 
Under a deterministic microeconomic analysis, firms in perfectly competitive markets are 
price-takers, which means that they have to operate with the ratio ெோ
ெ஼
  close one to have a 
positive Contribution Margin (CM) and be more profitable (LUSTOSA; FRANÇA, 2012). On 
the other hand, firms operating with high monopoly power tend to operate outside the economic 
equilibrium point where marginal costs and marginal revenues ratio is equal to one, since they 
are price-makers. For example, monopolistic firms may operate with idle capacity to respond 
market demand fluctuations or use this idle capacity as an entry barrier (THOMPSON; 
FORMBY, 2002), which do not correspond to a perfect market equilibrium and may lead to 
worse operational performance.  
Banker and Mashruwala (2007) argues that the relation between non-financial measures and 
financial performance can only be understood when competition is take into account. Porter 
(1989) states that competition shapes firms’ strategy and markets tend to vary between perfect 
competition levels and monopoly. Accepting the existence of market power, firms pursue 
competitive advantage to gain economic profits and more market power. Assuming that the 
main objective of the firm is to generate more profit, there is a deterministic force that drives 
managers to take optimal decisions that also affect costs behavior and plant size.  
Managers tend to be risk-takers in order to increase firm revenues. The firm leverage over its 
systematic risk can be measured by DOL (GAHLON, 1981), and have been modeled in several 
studies (CHUNG, 1989; DANTAS; MEDEIROS; LUSTOSA, 2006; DARRAT; 
MUKHERJEE, 1995; DUGAN; MINYARD; SHRIVER, 1994; FRANÇA, 2012; GAHLON, 
1981; GRIFFIN; DUGAN, 2003; HODGIN; KIYMAZ, 2005; HUFFMAN, 1983; LUSTOSA; 
FRANÇA, 2012). 
Considering previous researches, as shown above, we face a problem that take into account 
those findings and lead us to the following research problem: Is the relationship between 
firm’s operational performance and the degree of operating leverage subject to the 
moderation of market structure? 
Through an operational proxy, consists as research main objective:  
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Objective: Investigate the relationship between firms cost behavior and firms performance and 
observe the existence of a moderating influence of market structure on the relationship.  
As consequence, the research is subdivided in secondary objectives that provide the support to 
further analyses: 
O1: Investigate the relationship between cost behavior and risk metrics with firms’ operational 
performance. 
O2: Investigate the relation between cost behavior and risk metrics with firms’ operational 
performance when moderated by market structure. 
O3: Investigate the impact of firms’ size, as a moderator of the market structure moderation, on 
the relation between cost behavior and risk metrics. 
The CVP approach has its origins in the neoclassical economic theory (WICKRAMASINGHE; 
ALAWATTAGE, 2007) and addresses allocation problems, since managers face the economic 
problem of scarcity. In addition, managers can take it as a tool to allocation problems decisions 
(DOPUCH; BIRNBERG, 1969; KARNANI, 1983). Despite its utility, the CVP premise that 
firms operate in a perfect competition or monopolistic market (KARNANI, 1983), lead us to 
investigate the impact of market structure on the relation between operational risk and 
operational returns.  
Following Adar and Barnea (1977) construction of CM, we may expect that firms adjust their 
production considering the market they compete in. Firms that compete in markets with higher 
competition level tend to present better overall performance when they adjust their DOL to a 
lower level (LUSTOSA; FRANÇA, 2012), maximizing the production factors usage, since the 
firm do not hold any market power.  
Empirical research on operating leverage in Brazilian market is still incipient, with few 
evidences of this issue in emergent market (DANTAS; MEDEIROS; LUSTOSA, 2006; 
FRANÇA, 2012; LUSTOSA; FRANÇA, 2012). These studies do not verify the influence of 
market structure on the relationship between operating leverage and returns. For example, 
França (2012) analyzes only Manufacture industry as a competitive market; Dantas et al. (2006) 
research also does not consider different market structures. Our approach answers to economic 
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theory not only by adopting the CVP approach, but also by considering the market structure of 
firms’ industry to fill this gap on the literature. 
This chapter shows a preview of the following inquiry, contextualizing and presenting 
motivations and justification. The following chapter provides the theoretical basis for 
hypothesis development, presenting the main researches and concepts that permeate the 
following study and supports the hypothesis structuring. The third chapter will present the 
applied methodology, describing the sample selection, variables construction. The fourth 
chapter presents the econometric issues. The fifth debates the main results of the econometric 
models. The sixth is our conclusion, brings possibly implications of research discoveries, 
debates the research limitations and indicates further researches. 
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2. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. MARKET STRUCTURE 
The economic theory of the firm analysis the relation between a single firm and its industry, 
and states that the output result is the outcome of the market forces, considering market price 
(ALDRICH; PFEFFER, 1976). Differences in market-structure impacts on price and 
production decisions of competing firms on their industries (MAS-COLELL, WHINSTON; 
GREEN, 1995; THOMPSON; FORMBY, 2002). Under this concept, Besanko (2006) argues 
that the firm relies its conduct considering the market competitiveness. Also, at perfectly 
competitive markets, accounting numbers and economic theory are able to converge 
(BEAVER; DEMSKI, 1979), since there are no opportunity costs and we can identify that firms 
as price-takers and consider that MR and MC ratio is equal to 1 (FRANÇA, 2012).  
Competition level and market-share are also broadly analyzed due to its importance for the firm 
management decisions and profitability generation capability (GALE, 1972; RHOADES, 1993; 
SCHERER, 1965; SHEPHERD, 1972). However, assuming that markets, in general, price is 
not characterized as a certain item, as seen in Baron (1970) under economic perspective, and 
Jaedicke (1964) in managerial approach. 
Particular strategic orientation is impacted by the level of market dynamism where the firm 
competes (HAMBRICK, 1983; MCKEE, VARADARAJAN; PRIDE, 1989; SNOW; 
HAMBRICK, 1980), suggesting a link between business performance and competition, as an 
environmental condition.  
There is empirical evidence that alterations at economic conditions imposes significant 
limitation to firms (HALL, 2004), so that the competition plays a moderating effect between 
nonfinancial indicators and financial performance (BANKER; MASHRUWALA, 2007). Also, 
an increase of competitiveness and structural uncertainty exert opposite effects at the 
managerial ties capability of fostering firms’ performance in an emergent market (LI; POPPO; 
ZHOU, 2008). 
Banker and Mashruwala (2007) show that nonfinancial measures of performance may make 
sense in high competitive markets since that market structure gives power to consumers to 
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choose the same product offered by different firms and to employees more firms to work. But 
in near monopoly markets that affirmative may not be true for the opposite reasons. 
The relation between competition level with firms’ characteristics shown by previous studies 
denotes the necessity to consider the impact of the industry structure in our analyses. Then, we 
take managerial issues, such as plant size and cost structure, as the main decision due to its 
impact on firms’ operating capacity. Those decisions also determine the minimum selling price 
and production volume, leading us to the analysis of the structure and operating risk. 
2.2. SIZE 
Consider the impact of Size on firms’ performance led to diverse evidences. Literature shows 
that size plays a major variable for firm’s performance and for the study of performance at 
industry context, in both microeconomic theory and industrial organizational (BESANKO et 
al., 2006; PORTER, 1979), with firms inserted in a causality chain where firm’s size influences 
its performance (THOMPONSON; FORMBY, 1996). 
However, under an operational perspective, Size may lay different roles. On firms’ strategy, it 
may act as a barrier to entry, or be a source of economies of scale. On the other hand, Size also 
may corrode firms’ operational performance by operating with idle capacity and making the 
firm susceptible to market fluctuation with more rigid structure, considering market 
configuration. Firms’ cost structure may lead the firms to under-optimum resources 
remunerations especially in near perfect competition markets and to a lower operational 
performance, as consequence. 
Fiegenbaum and Karnani (1991) pointed to the necessity of big firms to operate with intense 
exploration of economies of scale. Also emphasizes that there is a trade-off between size and 
volume flexibility, where small firms have the advantage of flexibility on sales volume 
compared to the biggest firms. Since that the smaller firms do not incurs in economies of scale, 
managers are encouraged to perceive better performance by other means.  
The presence of small firms responds to theoretical requirements for the classical economists’ 
theory of perfectly competitive markets, where perfect competition plays its role at its fullest. 
On the other hand, a market with small number of firms (or even one firm) tends to the 
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monopolistic aspect of market configuration. The fluctuation between those two extreme points 
that market structure indicates an intrinsic relationship between size, operational performance 
and market structures. It also justifies the analysis of the moderating role of size on the 
moderation of market structure on the relationship between the operational performance and 
firms’ cost behavior. 
Researches have shown the relationship between increasing returns to scale and higher wages 
payment (PULL, 2003), with faster employment adjust for small Dutch firms (LEVER, 1996), 
and indications that  small size is the optimal firm size for export-oriented firms in Taiwan, 
when considering the relationship between size and productive efficiency (CHUANG, 1999).  
Marcus (1969) findings indicates an erratic relationship between firm size and profitability 
within an industry, with some firms showing a positive relationship and others showing a 
negative relationship. Due prior literature, we believe that size act as moderator of the 
moderating role of market structure on the relationship between DOL and operational 
performance. 
2.3. X’THE COST-VOLUME-PROFIT ANALYSIS 
The CVP analysis deals with the classical economic problem about the optimal level and output 
mix for the firm, assuming that as long as the firm has a set of resources and, at least, one cost 
is fixed. The accounting cost structure analysis has the necessary characteristics to be a proxy 
for the economic short run model, characterized by the emphasis on costs and revenue behavior 
over a set of variations of mix and outputs levels (DOPUCH; BIRNBERG, 1969). The CVP 
analysis is a simple analytical tool for management decisions (GUIDRY; HORRIGAN; 
CRAYCRAFT, 1998) that provides a wide financial overview of firms’ decision process 
(HORNGREN, FOSTER; DATAR, 1994). 
Based on economic model of optimal output decision under uncertainty, Adar, Barnea and Lev 
(1977) presented a comprehensive approach to CVP analysis. They provide a model where the 
managers can make decisions due to determination of optimal output, considering the expected 
return of alternative plans involving changes in costs, price and technology. The model can also 
determine the economic consequences of fixed costs variance, and the results have more broad 
range than only CVP analysis and fixed-cost variance analysis. The model also reaches 
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accounting problems such as common-cost allocation, transfer pricing systems and joint 
product pricing for divisionalized firms, by assuming price as the only source of uncertainty 
related to variable and fixed costs, which equals to determine the income through the difference 
between Contribution Margin and Total Fixed Costs. Under certainty, fixed costs do not have 
relevance. 
The accounting approach of cost structure analysis considers the linearity of fixed costs and 
fixed expenses, sales prices and variable costs per unit. Such relation assumes that, when firms 
approach the accounting break-even point, the income tends to zero, while Contribution Margin 
(CM) and fixed costs and expenses ratio tends to one. A production beyond the accounting 
break-even point generates a CM and fixed costs plus expenses ratio greater than 1, while 
income tend to be greater than 0. In competitive markets, accounting information have the 
informational capability that allows economic agents to take investment decision in order to 
increase their utility, since accounting numbers can capture changes on firm’s structure. 
However, economic results do not characterizes as an accounting information, impairing the 
approach applicability. 
To solve it, researchers have used the DOL as a proxy to capture how market reacts to results 
of managerial decisions. Theoretical and empirical researches related to DOL aim to reveal a 
relationship between the metric and the operating income, under effect of other variables as 
sales and costs (DUGAN; MINYARD; SHRIVER, 1994; DUGAN; SHRIVER, 1989; 
FRANÇA, 2012; GAHLON, 1981; HORNGREN; FOSTER; DATAR, 1994). França and 
Lustosa (2011) establishes an optimal production level using mathematically determined DOL 
as reference for competitive markets, which allows the economic agent to determine when firms 
are operating at an optimal level or with idle capacity (leveraged in fixed cost). 
Following this argument, it is possible to establish a relation between operational leverage and 
the law of diminishing returns (FRANÇA, 2012), so that an increment of a productive factor 
leads to an increment less than proportional on productiveness, ceteris paribus (THOMPSON; 
FORMBY, 2002). We assume the Operating Income by the function: 
OI = CM – FCt (1) 
18 
Where OI is operating income, CM is contributing margin and FCt total fixed cost. 
Comprehending CM as constant at unitary terms of each production level until the point of 
inflexion. Accounting concepts identifies increasing returns when the firm has a positive DOL, 
combining production volume and installed capacity. Neoclassical economic theory, however, 
focuses on acquiring the highest possible benefit level, anchored at the diminishing returns 
premise.  
In this point of view, performance analyses considering DOL as independent variable, answers 
to neoclassical economic theory of competition markets by two aspects, as shown by França 
(2012): First, by the intersection between the curves of Sales Prices and Total Cost that indicates 
the firm’s accounting break-even point, measured by: 
𝐵𝐸 =  
𝐹𝐶௧
𝐶𝑀௨௡௜௧
 (2) 
Where BE are the break-even point, which is represented in terms of volume, since the 
denominator has unitary volume representation; FCt  total fixed costs and fixes expenses; and, 
CM – or Contribution Margin – which is represented at unitary terms.  
The second aspect emerges from the firm revenue. At this point, the revenue is equalized to 
costs, indicating the minimum point of the firm’s revenue so that it does not incur in losses. In 
turn, the marginal revenue relates to each additional unit of production sold, with a sales price 
function 𝑀𝑅 =  ƒ (𝑆𝑃), where MR is the Marginal Revenue and SP represent the sales prices. 
The function shows that the revenue generated by each new sold unity may vary positively or 
negatively, since that a reduction on prices would increase the product demand, ceteris paribus. 
When firms operate at full capacity, CM and sales increasing are negatively associated since it 
indicates the necessity of new investments, and following this argument, idle capacity may 
increase the profit margin of the firm by an increase in sales (JORGENSEN; SADKA; LI, 
2009). 
The DOL can be used as a risk metric (HUFFMAN, 1983) since that differences in production 
process impacts on fixed and variable costs share (LEV, 1974), answering to the firm returns 
as shown in prior literature (MCDANIEL, 1984; NOVY-MARX, 2011; PERCIVAL, 1974). 
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DOL also explains why value premium is weak across industries and strong within industries 
as shown in a recent research (NOVY-MARX, 2011). 
2.4. RETURN ON INVESTED CAPITAL – ROIC 
The accounting income configures as the main contribution of the accounting model to the firm 
and interested parties on the business, due to its characteristics, specifically, to accrual basis 
premise, which demands the confrontation of revenues with the expenses and costs necessary 
to generate them. The accounting metric reflects the performance of a firm in a given period, 
regardless of the financial flow linked to the operation (PENMAN, 2010). 
Empirical researches that are based on the accounting model, adopt proxies from the accounting 
numbers to analyze the effects of managers' decisions and firms’ characteristics to compare 
performance and indicates that firms’ specific characteristics have major impact on 
performance than industry characteristics (LOUZADA, 2015). 
Accounting numbers allow the users to recognize the firm performance by means of return 
indexes, such as the Return over Assets (ROA), Return over Equity (ROE) and the Return over 
Invested Capital – ROIC.  
According to Simons (1999), Hough (2006), Misangyi et al., (2006), Chen and Huang (2006) 
and Goldszmidt (2010), the ROIC excludes the interests and taxes effects, seeking to isolate the 
operational return of the available operational resources to the firm. Chen and Huang (2006) 
argues that such number better reflects the firm operational decision making and, then, it should 
be preferred in relation to the metrics based on total assets or the equity. Also, it configures as 
a relation between operational profits and operational revenues, acting as a reliable investment 
decision indicator (LOUZADA, 2015). 
2.5. HYPOTHESES  
At Brazilian market, the relationship between returns and DOL has been studied by Tabak and 
Guerra (2002), Dantas et al.  (2006), Lustosa and França (2011) and França and Lustosa (2012). 
França and Lustosa (2012) points that in a near competitive market that is a negative 
relationship between DOL and returns. Considering DOL as a metric of operational risk, as 
shown by Gahlon (1981), we hypothesize that: 
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H1 – There is an association between the Degree of Operation Leverage and the Operational 
Performance. 
Nature and degree of competition shapes firms’ strategy (PORTER, 1989). Considering that 
market structure impacts on firms’ costs behavior and industry returns. Then, we hypothesize 
that:  
H2 – The relation between operational return and cost behavior is moderated by the market 
structure, measured by market competition level 
As literature suggests, size may have significant impact on firm performance, as source of 
organization costs (SHEPHERD, 1972) or as source of scale economies (BESANKO, 2006; 
THOMPSON; FORMBY, 2002; VARIAN, 2006). Considering the relation between 
organizational variables and economic variables and that firms’ size may influence on firms’ 
operational performance and market structure, we hypothesize that: 
H3 – Market competition level moderation of the relationship between operational return and 
cost behavior is moderated by firms’ size. 
Figure 1 represents the 3 hypotheses in the research design: 
 
Figure 1 – Hypotheses design. 
The following chapter presents the applied methods, in order to define our sample, the variables 
construction and the applied econometric issues.  
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3. METHOD 
3.1. VARIABLES 
3.1.1. Performance Measurement: Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 
We use the Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) as a performance measurement in order to 
capture the operational approach of the firm and its sensitivity or exposure to different cost 
structure (SIMONS, 1999): 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 = ா஻ூ்஽஺೟
஺௦௦௘௧_஺ௗ௝ ೟
  (3) 
This research aims to study firm operational performance, detached from the exposure to taxes 
among industries. The Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) overrides other profit lines on the income statement, such as NOPLAT, NOPAT, 
EBIT or Net Income, due to its alignment with the research purposes.  
These three income measures consider the amount of embedded taxes. Net Income, NOPLAT 
and NOPAT are limited proxies for our analyses since they capture taxes, and we are looking 
at the firm’s operational capability to generate profit. As long as the firms are competing, their 
fixed capital structure will respond differently to the same level of production, which reflects 
different depreciation levels, as captured by EBIT. 
3.1.2. Degree of Operating Leverage 
The Degree of Operating Leverage means the sensitivity of income to a variation of the 
revenues. We follow Garrison and Noreen (2001) on the following equation to calculate the 
traditional observed DOL: 
∆𝑂𝐼௜,௧
∆(𝑁𝑅௜,௧)
 (4) 
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Where OIi,t  is the operating income of firm i at quarter t; and, NRi,t  is the net revenue of firm i 
at quarter t. The variable aim to capture how market reacts to results of managerial decisions 
regarding firm costs structure. 
3.1.3. Market Structure 
Dhaliwal et al. (2008) and Gjerde et al. (2002) concurs that industry specific facts exert impact 
on firm performance variability. In this perspective, we may use the Herfindhal-Hirshman as a 
metric of product market competition. According to Besanko et al. (2006), the index is captured 
by the function: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ᵢ)ଶ௡௜ୀଵ   (5) 
Where Market-share is the net operating revenue of a firm i (or its total assets) scaled by the 
total of the industry. Kelly (1981) and Rhoads (1993) agree that the Herfindhal Index ought to 
be carefully interpreted due to its limitations, such as requiring public data of each firm, which 
is unavailable. 
Table 1 shows the market structure classification of the research. We follow Besanko (2006) 
approach for the HHI. 
Table 1 - Market Structure and Competition Level 
Nature of Competition Range of Herfindahls Intensity of Competition 
Perfect Competition Usually bellow .2 Fierce 
Monopolistic Competition Usually above .2 Fierce or light, depending on product differentiation 
Oligopoly .2 to .6 Fierce or light, depending on interfirm rivalry 
Monopoly .6 and above Light, unless that is an entry threat 
Source: Besanko (2006). 
Besanko et al. (2006) consider the relative size of the biggest firms to be a major factor on the 
management and, consequently, on the performance. Then, the information quality conveyed 
by the HHI justifies its usefulness.  
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3.1.4. Size 
Size has been subject of analysis over the years. Shepherd (1972), Hansen and Wenerfelt (1989) 
and Leon Li and Huang (2011) points toward a positive relationship between Size and return. 
However, Lever (1996), Chuang (1999) and Pull (2003) shows a counter-hypothesis, that Size 
plays a negative role on firm’s performance.  
The firm’s size is given by the following equation: 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚ᇱ𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  (6) 
To understand the role of Size at Brazilian market on the relationship between DOL and 
operational performance we will address the question by observing Size as a moderating 
variable of the relationship between DOL and ROIC. 
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4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
4.1. DATA SELECTION AND TREATMENT  
4.1.1. Data Selection 
Firms listed at BM&FBovespa between 1998 and 2016 compose the sample. We exclude firms 
from Financial, Funds, Security industries due to its intrinsic characteristics. Also, sectors under 
regulation demand a different approach due to different sector dynamics, which may impact on 
the observed firms returns. 
Table 2 - Sample Selection 
Sectors Original Sub-sample 
Farming 9 9 
Food Processors & Beverage 51 51 
Commerce 35 35 
Construction and Engineering 11 11 
Electronics and Household Appliance 20 20 
Electric Utilities 87 - 
Financial Intermediaries & Securization  157 - 
Financial Management and Mutual Funds 3 - 
Machines and Equipments 11 11 
Mining 13 13 
Non Metalics 9 9 
Others 208 - 
Wood and Paper 13 13 
Oil, Gas and Biofuels 11 11 
Chemicals 43 43 
Steel and Metalurgy 52 52 
Software and Services 5 - 
Textiles 39 39 
Transportation  74 74 
Vehicles and Components 28 28 
Total 879 419 
Percentage 100% 57.56% 
Source: Author 
The characteristics of our research and characteristics of some sectors demand not to consider 
all database. In addition to the exclusion of the Finance and Insurance and Funds sectors due 
to their specific regulations, Others sector were excluded due to the difficult to stablish firm 
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market competition level. The Energy sector exclusion is due to the strong regulation and other 
industry specific characteristics. Software and data exclusion occur due to the reduced number 
of observations. The report of exclusions is shown on Table 2 that discriminates the database 
per sector. All data were non-consolidated and obtained at ECONOMATICA® and 
COMDINHEIRO®, specialized databases for market information. From the original 879 firms, 
419 firms remained on the database after sector exclusions, which represents 47.67% of the 
original sample 
In addition, negative results were also excluded from our database. The same treatment were 
applied to missing values. Table 3 shows the number of excluded observations: 
Table 3 - Sample selection process 
Excluded Observations Number of Observations 
Original sample 26.571 
Negative Gross Revenue 1.709 
Negative EBIT 10.665 
Negative Net Revenue 37 
Other negative results or missing values 663 
Total 13.497 
Source: Author 
From the original 26.571 observations that remained after our first sample selection by 
exclusion of subsectors, we found 13.497 observations in our database that compose the Full 
Sample after the second sample selection. As represented on Table 3, Negative EBIT shows as 
the main reason for observation exclusion with 10.665 observations exclusions. 
4.1.2. Data Treatment 
Previous analysis on our dependent variable shows the ROIC mean greater than median1, which 
suggest a positive skewness; kurtosis, denoting a high level of information in the extremes of 
the distribution; and, we observe a maximum value of 5,745.80, which causes an expressive 
difference between mean and median for our dependent variable. In addition, there is a large 
distance between median and maximum value, denoting an asymmetry distribution. As 
consequence, ROIC shows a high standard deviation, which denotes a presence of outliers on 
                                                 
1 As show on table 15 at append. 
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the distribution. Outliers may disturb the regression significance, and the selected procedure 
was the exclusion of outliers.  
Taking into account that the variables variance allows to standardize the DOL and Size 
variables, we were able to put those variables in range. The procedure increases the data quality 
since it provides a sensible unit scale. In this sense “Scaling should be performed in such a way 
that the variances of the measurements reflect their relative importance” (KRESTA; 
MACGREGOR; MARLIN, 1991, p. 44), which is what we aim to capture with those variables 
in our research. Table 4 shows the final sample descriptive statistics2: 
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics 
Stats ROICC DOLRG HHI SIZERG 
N 13,497 13,497 13,497 13,497 
mean -0.7925132 0.0094421 0.2583533 0.0875421 
sd 7.813952 0.0457071 0.176205 0.1570579 
kurtosis 602.7083 326.3715 6.750022 14.36719 
skewness 18.54133 16.55806 1.698413 3.217954 
cv -9.859712 4.840796 0.6820311 1.794085 
min -18.93342 0 0.0677249 0 
max 353.9422 1 0.8766502 1 
p25 -2.679531 0.0010099 0.1276707 0.0073415 
p50 -1.490238 0.0021058 0.2569522 0.0284723 
p75 0.1536622 0.0066064 0.3479501 0.0866556 
Notes: (i) ROICc represents the centered Return On Invested 
Capital; (ii) DOLrg represents the Degree of Operating Leverage in 
range; (iii) HHI represents the Herfindah-Hirschman Index, which 
contemplates the market competition level on the sector; and, (iv) 
Sizerg represents the firm size in range. 
The ROIC treatment, in turn, considers the variable and study object characteristics. Differences 
between sectors structure lead to differences on firm operational return exigencies. Centering 
the variable allows a more trusted analysis, since the comparability analysis refers to the 
distance of firms ROIC from the sector ROIC mean. 
The treatment enhanced the quality of the variables. The outlier exclusions solved the high 
standard deviation and mean greater than median problems with the dependent variable, 
allowing to consider ROIC in range and proceed with the research. It is noteworthy that the 
                                                 
2 Descriptive statistics with outliers on append, table 16. 
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negative ROIC observations, after we center the variable, do not represent negative ROIC 
effectively, but how distant the observation is from the corresponding sector mean. 
4.2. MARKET STRUCTURE 
For data exploitation and additional tests, we also investigate subsectors HHI, which represents 
the market competition level for each subsector within the three sectors. For robust analyses, 
the competition level was determined for each subsector to maintain the analysis of firm 
performance in comparison with the market competition level of its subsector. Table 5 
represents the HHI for each subsector and the competition level classification in accordance 
with the approach adopted by Besanko (2006): 
We identify 18 subsectors in our full sample, grouped in three sectors. From those 18 
subsectors, we identify one perfect competition sector, eleven oligopolistic sectors and six near 
monopoly sectors on our database, which indicates the low level of competitiveness at Brazilian 
market. The output of grouping the sub-sectors into sectors are demonstrated in the following 
Table 5, which represents the HHI that we adopt in our models. 
When the index walks toward zero, we have less monopolistic power, which means that when 
the coefficient comes near zero the market walks toward competitiveness. When the HHI is 
over 0.6, we have more concentration, which means that the market has more monopolistic 
structure characteristics. This interpretation is aligned with Besanko (2006) approach, as 
demonstrated at Table 1.  
We categorize the Industry and Commerce subsectors of our sample as Oligopolistic markets 
due the mean HHI observed for those sectors. The Industry sector, however, shows itself as the 
more approximated of a perfectly competition market, when compared with other sectors of our 
sample. Commerce have only two highly polarized subsector allocated in it. Services shows the 
lowest dispersion and the subsector is classified as a monopolistic market.  
The intrinsic market characteristics and the reduced quality level of data at Brazilian market 
may play a major role on the explanation of the observed behavior for all variables. The 
treatment that we applied are in the best of our knowledge the preferred treatment for the 
problems that we faced during the research.  
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Table 5 - Subgroups Market Structure 
Sectors Subsectors Observations Mean Classification 
In
du
st
ry
 
Textiles 2,342 0.1277 Perfect Competition 
Steel and Metalurgy 3,546 0.2312 Oligopoly 
Food Processors & Beverage 3,681 0.2504 Oligopoly 
Wood and Paper 870 0.2580 Oligopoly 
Vehicles and Components 1,7 0.3480 Oligopoly 
Non Metalics 674 0.3507 Oligopoly 
Chemicals 3,03 0.3523 Oligopoly 
Electronics and Household Appliance 1,369 0.4641 Oligopoly 
Software and Services 324 0.5156 Oligopoly 
Machines and Equipments 720 0.5483 Oligopoly 
Oil, Gas and Biofuels 495 0.8581 Monopoly 
Mining 822 0.8767 Monopoly 
Mean 19,573 0.4317 Oligopoly 
C
om
m
er
ce
 
Commerce 2,481 0.2648 Oligopoly 
Oil, Gas and Biofuels 82 0.8581 Monopoly 
Mean 2,563 0.5614 Oligopoly 
Se
rv
ic
es
 
Transportation 5,476 0.2570 Oligopoly 
Construction and Engineering 727 0.6842 Monopoly 
Oil, Gas and Biofuels 161 0.8581 Monopoly 
Mining 62 0.8767 Monopoly 
Mean 6,426 0.6690 Monopoly  
  Source: Author 
The main result of the existence of this limitation regarding the database is the need of 
precaution when interpreting our outputs. Our variables are mainly endogenous and the 
difficulties that we face when considering data quality for the Brazilian market, as the low 
number of observations, prevents us to do any prevision about firms future behavior but allows 
us to look upon firms choices and analyze those choices impacts and indicate those who led the 
best output on the period. 
4.3. CORRELATION  
Table 6 shows the Pearson correlation for the variables used in the models. The results show 
multicollinearity problems between the variables. Varying between -1 and 1, any result close 
to the extreme points indicates a strong positive (negative) correlation between the variables.  
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Table 6 - Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 ROICc DOLrg Sizerg HHI 
ROICc 1    
DOLrg -0.0649*** 1   
Sizerg -0.0137* -0.0239*** 1  
HHI 0.000000 0.138*** 0.0937*** 1 
Observations 35324    
Notes: (i) ROICc represents the centered Return On 
Invested Capital; (ii) DOLrg represents the Degree of 
Operating Leverage in range; (iii) Sizerg represents the firm 
size in range; (iv) HHI represents the Herfindah-Hirschman 
Index, which contemplates the market competition level on 
the sector.  
There is statistical significance for the correlation between the variables except for ROIC and 
HHI. However, all statistical significances coefficients were near zero, which denotes a weak 
correlation between variables. Some correlation level was predicted due to variables 
endogeneity.  
4.4. VARIANCE INFLATION TEST 
Variation Inflation test (VIF) verifies the existence of multicollinearity problems within the 
regression variables. Fávero (2009) argues that a VIF above five indicates the possibility of 
Type II errors occurs and, in a less conservative position, Gujarati (2006) suggest that 
multicollinearity problems occurs when VIF is above 10. Table 7 shows the VIF test for our 
variables. 
Table 7 - Variance Inflation Test Results 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
DOL        5.19 0.192708 
HHI 1.47 0.680328 
DOL*HHI        5.14 0.194553 
Size 4.57 0.21865 
DOL*Size        7.56 0.132329 
HHI*Size        5.67 0.176521 
DOL*HHI*Size       7.88 0.126826 
Mean VIF        5.35 
Source: Author 
Following Fávero (2009) we found that there is a small chance of errors Type II to occur, and 
in Gujarati (2006) perspective, our variables do not show multicollinearity problems. 
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5. MODELS AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
In order to test the hypotheses 1, the study demands the estimation of the models 1 and 2: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ 
Where 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶௜,௧ means the Operational return over invested capital of the firm i at the quarter t; 
𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ represents the degree of operational leverage for firm i at the quarter t; and, HHI 
represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for firm i at the quarter t. Accordingly with the 
arguments exposed in section 2.3, we expect a positively relation between DOL and ROIC. 
In addition, we estimate the model 2: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ 
Where 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ represents firms’ size of firm i at the quarter t; with the addition of Size at the 
model as control variable we expect to verify the impact of Size at firms operational 
performance.  
To test the second and third hypothesis, we estimate the model 3: 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧
+ 𝛽ହ𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ + 𝛽଺𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧ ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ + 𝛽଻𝐷𝑂𝐿௜,௧ ∗ 𝐻𝐻𝐼௜,௧
∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ 
Where we test the moderating role of market structure on this relationship. Then, we expect the 
𝛽ସ to be negatively related with the dependent variable, and this will weak the significance of 
the 𝛽ଵ coefficient. Also, with the 𝛽଻ we analyze the existence of Size moderation at the 
moderating role of market structure on the relationship between operational performance and 
cost behavior. We use the proxies represented on Table 8.  
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Table 8 - Variables description 
 Variable Expected signal Name Description Reference Syntax 
In
te
re
st 
V
ar
ia
bl
e Return On 
Invested 
Capital 
Dependent 
Variable ROIC 
Captures operational 
performance of the 
firm, detached from 
the exposure among 
the industries. 
(SIMONS, 1999; 
GOLDSZMIDT, 
2010) 
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴௧
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝐴𝑑𝑗 ௧
 
Degree of 
Operating 
Leverage 
Negative DOL 
Captures income 
sensitivity to a 
variation of the 
revenues. 
(GARRISON. 
NOREEN, 2001) 
∆𝑂𝐼௜,௧
∆(𝑁𝑅௜௧)
 
M
od
er
at
in
g 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 Market 
Structure ? HHI 
Captures market 
structure and its 
impacts on firms’ 
operational 
performance. 
(BESANKO, 
2006) 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 −௡௜ୀଵ
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ᵢ)ଶ  
Size Positive SIZE 
Captures the impact of 
size on the moderating 
role of market 
competition of the 
relationship between 
DOL and ROIC. 
(MARCUS, 1969; 
PORTER, 1979) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 =
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚ᇱ𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 −
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟′𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡  
Source: Author 
All following models are robust. The next subtopics bring the results and debate the findings of 
our models. 
5.1. FULL SAMPLE MODEL 
We run the regression for our Full Sample, subdivided in three models that contemplates all 
variables. We aim to analyze if we have the evidences for the theoretical approach of market 
characteristics playing an important role in firm’s performance (CAVES; CHRISTENSEN; 
TRETHEWAY, 1984). The microeconomic theory also points toward a major impact of market 
structure on firms’ costs structure (MAS-COLELL; WHINSTON; GREEN, 1995) and 
McGahan and Porter (1997) shows the existence of a relation between firms’ performance and 
industry specific effects. The table 9 presents the output of the three models of our research, 
when regressed for our Full Sample. 
The model (1) considers the relation of DOL, with HHI as control variable, with firms’ 
operational performance. Considering the relation between plant size and cost structure with 
firms’ operational performance and the possible impact on firms’ cost structure choices, model 
(2) add Size as control variable to measure the impact of firms’ structure on ROIC. 
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Table 9 - Full Sample Output 
Variables Full_Sample 
(1) (2) (3) 
Constant 1.924*** 1.909*** 2.667*** 
  (17.05) (16.40) (15.34) 
DOL -6.533*** -6.506*** -6.946*** 
  (-7.075) (-7.045) (-3.161) 
HHI -10.28*** -10.28*** -11.07*** 
  (-25.34) (-25.36) (-22.00) 
Size   0.156 -2.371*** 
    (0.708) (-3.646) 
DOL * HHI     1.570 
      (0.219) 
HHI * Size     7.656*** 
      (3.133) 
DOL * Size     29.79 
      (1.031) 
DOL * HHI * Size     -82.15 
      (-1.135) 
Observations 13497 13497 13497 
R² 17.70% 17.70% 18.00% 
Adjusted R² 17.60% 17.60% 17.90% 
Industry Control No No No 
F-Stat 367.2 245.9 116.5 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) 
for Model (1) that represents DOL and HHI regressed against ROIC; (2) for 
Model (2) that represents DOL, HHI and Size regressed against ROIC; (3) for 
Model (3) that represents DOL, HHI, Size, DOL*HHI and DOL*HHI*Size 
regressed against ROIC. 
The previous two models intend to demonstrate the existence of the relationship between DOL 
and ROIC at Brazilian market and act as a pre-test for the main model and respond to the inquiry 
of our first objective. Model (3) analyze the relation between DOL and operational performance 
moderated by market structure and analyze the impact of Size, when acting as moderator of the 
HHI moderation.  
We found a negative signal for DOL at model (1), and our output shows that when compared 
to the mean, an increase on DOL have a negative impact on firms’ operational performance 
when compared with sectors’ mean, with statistical significance at 1% level. The results also 
contributes to França and Lustosa (2012) findings for Brazilian market that shows market, on 
the mean, punishes those firms who operates under the economic efficiency, in a competitive 
market, shown by a negative correlation between stock return and DOL.  
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For the HHI variable, with statistical significance at 1% level, we found that more competition 
relates negatively with ROIC, which align with previous results on the relationship between 
DOL and performance at Brazilian market. More competition lead to lower economic profit. 
When market are in perfect competition there is no opportunity costs and all firms operates on 
MR and MC ratio equal to 1, with no abnormal profit (VARIAN, 2006).  
Firms’ size influences firm performance (MARCUS, 1969) and may influence on firm 
operational performance. Including Size as control variable in our model (2), however, do not 
alters the regression output and the variable do not show statistical significance. In addition, it 
does not alter HHI significance, signal or coefficient magnitude. For DOL, significance and 
signal remains the same, but it does have a subtle impact on DOL’s coefficient, which indicates 
that Size plays a role on the relationship between degree of operating leverage and firms’ 
operational performance.  
This output raises questions about Size role to the firm’s operational performance. It leads to 
the analysis of the relationship under the perspective of size acting as a moderator variable of 
the HHI moderating role on the relationship between operational performance and degree of 
operating leverage and consider the different impacts that Size may have between and within 
sectors. 
To verify the validity of this approach, our third model includes HHI as proxy for market 
structure moderating the relationship between DOL and ROIC, and Size as a moderating 
variable of the HHI moderation.  
For our full sample, the moderating role of market structure on the relationship between cost 
structure and operational performance do not show statistical significance, not even when 
moderated by Size. However, literature suggest that the heterogeneity between different sectors 
and market structure may have a major role in the absence of statistical significance (HANSEN; 
WERNERFELT, 1989; PORTER, 1979, 1989; SHEPHERD, 1972), especially when we 
consider the assumption of perfect competition or monopoly where the DOL roots 
(WICKRAMASINGHE; ALAWATTAGE, 2007). 
 
34 
5.2. MODEL BY SECTORS 
McGahan and Porter (1997) shows that profitability has a complex relationship with different 
characteristics, as industry effects, and how those variables impact on profitability depends of 
firms’ sector. Following the argument, we divided our sample in three major groups: Industry, 
Commerce and Services. The main criteria for this subdivision resides in the difference of 
structures for those three major groups.  
The Table 10 gives us the model output for the three groups separated by sector, and we can 
observe that the variable signals for DOL, HHI and Size for all sectors remains the same as for 
the full sample regression. In addition, for the model (1) we have a reduction on statistical 
significance for DOL variable in Commerce and Services groups. 
For the Commerce and Service groups, we found in model (1) that market structure highly 
influences on firms’ operational performance, ceteris paribus, more than Industry sector, as 
captured by HHI coefficients on the regression. We can also interpret the HHI coefficient at 
model (1) for Full Sample regression in the same way.  
On model (2), we can identify that Size have statistically significance at 1 % as a controlling 
variable for Commerce and Services sector, with negative signal for both groups and bigger 
coefficient on Services sector.  
This output indicates that firm structure have different impacts between sectors and is aligned 
with the expectancy of increase on models relevance when subdivide the database. The addition 
of Size as controlling variable led to slightly difference in HHI and DOL coefficients, without 
any signal changes. 
The model (3) is our main model, and we subdivided the analysis in three sectors to a better 
understand of our findings and to allow us to compare with our full sample. The model (3) aim 
to capture the moderating effect of market structure on the relationship between DOL and ROIC 
and analyze the double-moderation role exert by Size on market structure moderation of the 
relationship between ROIC and DOL.  
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Table 10 - Outputs subdivided by sectors 
Variables Full_Sample Industry Commerce Services 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 1.924*** 1.909*** 1.158*** 1.186*** 6.357*** 6.487*** 4.769*** 5.290*** 
  (17.05) (16.40) (8.902) (8.715) (45.14) (42.15) (9.635) (8.496) 
DOL -6.533*** -6.506*** -7.378*** -7.441*** -10.35* -10.42* -7.060** -7.729** 
  (-7.075) (-7.045) (-7.133) (-7.129) (-1.824) (-1.837) (-2.148) (-2.254) 
HHI -10.28*** -10.28*** -7.107*** -7.090*** -25.10*** -25.25*** -16.99*** -17.11*** 
  (-25.34) (-25.36) (-14.96) (-14.99) (-80.40) (-78.81) (-17.58) (-16.86) 
Size   0.156   -0.318   -0.911***   -5.652*** 
    (0.708)   (-1.240)   (-2.747)   (-3.275) 
Observations 13497 13497 7435 7435 1141 1141 2137 2137 
R² 17.70% 17.70% 10.50% 10.60% 64.80% 65.00% 6.00% 6.30% 
Adjusted R² 17.60% 17.60% 10.50% 10.50% 64.70% 64.90% 5.93% 6.16% 
Industry 
Control No No No No No No No No 
F-Stat 367.2 245.9 151.6 101.4 3295 2200 162.0 113.4 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) for Model (1) that represents DOL 
and HHI regressed against ROIC; (2) for Model (2) that represents DOL, HHI and Size regressed against ROIC; 
(3) for Model (3) that represents DOL, HHI, Size, DOL*HHI and DOL*HHI*Size regressed against ROIC. 
HAIR et. al. (2008) states that moderating effect occurs when an independent variable can affect 
a regression by changing the relation between the independent variable of the regression and a 
dependent variable, when the value of the moderator variable changes. The following 
subsectors shows the output results for model (3), which captures the moderating effect, when 
compared to Full Sample results. 
5.2.1. INDUSTRY 
Observing the outputs for Full Sample regression, we found that HHI, DOL and Size are 
statistically significant at model (3). However, the moderation effect of market structure, 
captured by DOL moderated by HHI, or double-moderation effect, captured by Size’s 
moderating impact of the HHI moderation of DOL, were not statistically significant at model 
(3).  
For the Industry subsector, we can point that DOL are statistically significant at 10% level with 
a negative signal, with reduction on significance level and subtle change on coefficient when 
compared with our Full Sample, which indicates a reduction of DOL role on performance at 
Industry sector. Table 11 presents the regression outputs: 
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Table 11 - Industry Sector Output 
Variables 
Full_Sample Industry 
(3) (3) 
Constant 2.667*** 0.916*** 
  (15.34) (5.184) 
DOL -6.946*** -6.195* 
  (-3.161) (-1.772) 
HHI -11.07*** -6.226*** 
  (-22.00) (-9.634) 
Size -2.371*** 1.417** 
  (-3.646) (2.037) 
DOL * HHI 1.570 -5.327 
  (0.219) (-0.435) 
HHI * Size 7.656*** -5.397** 
  (3.133) (-2.020) 
DOL * Size 29.79 30.65 
  (1.031) (0.836) 
DOL * HHI * Size -82.15 -29.66 
  (-1.135) (-0.393) 
Observations 13497 7435 
R² 18.00% 10.80% 
Adjusted R² 17.90% 10.80% 
Industry Control No No 
F-Stat 116.5 51.15 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) for Model (1) that 
represents DOL and HHI regressed against ROIC; 
(2) for Model (2) that represents DOL, HHI and 
Size regressed against ROIC; (3) for Model (3) that 
represents DOL, HHI, Size, DOL*HHI and 
DOL*HHI*Size regressed against ROIC. 
The HHI is statistically significant at 1% level with negative signal. Comparing with Full 
Sample, we also observed a reduction of coefficient, indicating that in the Industry sector the 
impact of market structure is perceived with lower intensity when compared with our Full 
Sample. 
Size shows some alterations regarding model (3) for Industry and in comparison with model 
(3) for our Full Sample: Size as controlling variable become statistically significant at 5% level, 
with a positive sign, in comparison with the Full Sample regression.  
Industry is the sector with lower HHI, indicating that is the nearest to competition sector. The 
output for Size shows that larger firms in Industry sector have better operational performance 
when compared with the sectors mean, ceteris paribus, which indicates that firms may profit 
from positive economies of scale due increase on firms’ margin by reducing unitary costs. Only 
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Industry sector shows a positive sign and statistically significant coefficient for Size, indicating 
that this sector have characteristics that differentiates it from others.  
Market structure do not exert a moderating role on the relationship between DOL and ROIC, 
not even when market structure moderation is moderated by size, as indicated by the absence 
of statistical significance for both variables (DOL*HHI and DOL*HHI*Size), leading to the 
rejection of the H2 and H3 for Industry. 
5.2.2. COMMERCE 
In Commerce sector, at model (3), DOL do not present statistical significance; the HHI 
coefficient maintain its statistical significance at 1% level with negative signal; and, Size does 
not shows statistical significance. Table 12 presents the output for Commerce: 
Table 12 - Commerce Sector Output 
Variables Full_Sample Commerce 
(3) (3) 
Constant 2.667*** 6.120*** 
  (15.34) (12.16) 
DOL -6.946*** -24.84 
  (-3.161) (-0.514) 
HHI -11.07*** -23.91*** 
  (-22.00) (-13.08) 
Size -2.371*** -502.6 
  (-3.646) (-0.964) 
DOL * HHI 1.570 59.64 
  (0.219) (0.331) 
HHI * Size 7.656*** 1,896 
  (3.133) (0.963) 
DOL * Size 29.79 94,411* 
  (1.031) (1.799) 
DOL * HHI * Size -82.15 -356,666* 
  (-1.135) (-1.800) 
Observations 13497 1141 
R² 18.00% 65.30% 
Adjusted R² 17.90% 65.00% 
Industry Control No No 
F-Stat 116.5 . 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) for Model (1) that represents 
DOL and HHI regressed against ROIC; (2) for 
Model (2) that represents DOL, HHI and Size 
regressed against ROIC; (3) for Model (3) that 
represents DOL, HHI, Size, DOL*HHI and 
DOL*HHI*Size regressed against ROIC. 
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That indicates an important role of market structure at Commerce sector, due the absence of 
significance for DOL, which represents firms’ cost structure, or for Size.  
We can visualize the effect looking at the extreme points of the Graph 1 straight lines. The 
impact of market structure on the relationship between operational performance and costs 
behavior is shows by the tendency of the relation when occurs a reduction on market 
competition. The continuous line indicates firms with higher DOL*Size, and the dotted line, 
those firms with lower DOL*Size: 
GRAPH 1 – Double-moderation effect on Commerce sector 
 
Notes: (i) Double-moderation DOL ← Size represents DOL*HHI*Size variable; 
(ii) ROIC represents the centered Return On Invested Capital; (iii) DOL represents 
the Degree of Operating Leverage in range; (iv) HHI represents the Herfindah-
Hirschman Index, which contemplates the market competition level on the sector; 
and, (v) Size represents the firm size in range 
 
Graph 1 shows that, on mean, firms with higher DOL shows greater mean returns when 
compared with firms’ with lower DOL on Commerce sector. The Size moderation on the 
moderating role of market structure on the relationship between DOL and ROIC lead to 
differential effects on the relationship between DOL and ROIC. As the sector walks toward 
monopoly, larger firms shows a negative tendency while smaller companies shows a positive 
tendency, at mean. In addition, the lines slope indicates that bigger firms operational 
performance are more sensitive to a decrease on competitiveness than the smaller firms are. 
 
DOL ← Size 
(+)
DOL ← Size 
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R
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5.2.3. SERVICES 
The Services sector, as also observed in Commerce, do not show statistical significance for 
DOL in our model (3), differing from our Full Sample. Market structure seems to have more 
important rule than firms’ cost choices on firm operational returns, considering the statistical 
significance of HHI. However, on Services sector Size is statistical significant at 1%. It 
indicates that a decrease of competitiveness and lead to a reduction of firms’ operational 
performance when compared to sector mean.  
When compared with our Full Sample, we can observe that HHI have more influence on firms’ 
operational performance due the decrease of coefficient. In addition, the models output shows 
for Size statistical significance at 1% level and coefficient decrease, which indicates that larger 
firms have worse operational performance than mean in Services sector. The outputs for model 
(3) on Services sector are show on Table 13. 
Table 13 - Services Sector Output 
Variables Full_Sample Services 
(3) (3) 
Constant 2.667*** 3.862*** 
  (15.34) (16.24) 
DOL -6.946*** 8.729 
  (-3.161) (1.609) 
HHI -11.07*** -17.81*** 
  (-22.00) (-26.24) 
Size -2.371*** -16.41*** 
  (-3.646) (-13.13) 
DOL * HHI 1.570 -19.21*** 
  (0.219) (-2.917) 
HHI * Size 7.656*** 44.69*** 
  (3.133) (13.84) 
DOL * Size 29.79 -312.5*** 
  (1.031) (-3.030) 
DOL * HHI * Size -82.15 687.1*** 
  (-1.135) (3.366) 
Observations 13497 2137 
R² 18.00% 36.50% 
Adjusted R² 17.90% 36.20% 
Industry Control No No 
F-Stat 116.5 116.7 
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (1) for Model (1) that 
represents DOL and HHI regressed against ROIC; 
(2) for Model (2) that represents DOL, HHI and 
Size regressed against ROIC; (3) for Model (3) that 
represents DOL, HHI, Size, DOL*HHI and 
DOL*HHI*Size regressed against ROIC. 
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For Services sector we found statistical significance for the moderating effect of market 
structure on the relationship between ROIC and DOL. The result differs from our Full Sample, 
Industry and Commerce outputs where no statistical significance where found. At Services 
sector, the moderating role of market structure on the relationship between DOL and ROIC 
shows statistical significance at 1% level and negative sign. Graph 2 provide us with a 
comparable mean and tendencies acting as a guide to understand the regression output: 
Graph 2 – Moderation of Market Structure on Services sector 
Notes: (i) The-moderation DOL represents DOL*HHI variable; (ii) ROIC 
represents the centered Return On Invested Capital; (iii) DOL represents the 
Degree of Operating Leverage in range; and, (iv) HHI represents the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, which contemplates the market competition level on the sector. 
Graph 2 shows that, on mean, firms with higher DOL shows greater mean operational returns 
when compared with firms’ with lower DOL. When we consider the moderating effect of 
market structure on the relation between ROIC and DOL, the model suggests that with a 
decrease on competition level of the sector, firms perceive a reduction of the effect of DOL on 
firms’ ROIC.  
When we add Size on the regression, as a double-moderation of the relationship between ROIC 
and DOL, it presents statistical significance at 1% level and with positive sign. Graph 3 shows 
the effect of the double-moderation on Services sector.  
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Graph 3 – Double-moderation effect on Services sector 
 
Notes: (i) Double-moderation DOL ← Size represents DOL*HHI*Size variable; 
(ii) ROIC represents the centered Return On Invested Capital; (iii) DOL represents 
the Degree of Operating Leverage in range; (iv) HHI represents the Herfindah-
Hirschman Index, which contemplates the market competition level on the sector; 
and, (v) Size represents the firm size in range 
Graph 3 shows that, on mean, firms with higher DOL shows greater mean operational returns 
when compared with firms’ with lower DOL. Size double-moderation on the relation between 
ROIC and DOL lead to an dispersive behavior of the relationship between DOL and ROIC 
when we compare the larger firms with smaller firms. As the sector walks toward monopoly, 
larger firms shows a positive tendency while smaller companies shows a negative tendency, at 
mean. 
Models’ output suggests that Size variable moderates the market structure moderation on the 
relationship between DOL and ROIC for Services sector, with the opposite effect of the effect 
founded for Commerce sector. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Our findings suggest that market structure exert a moderator effect on the relation between DOL 
and ROIC, with an increase of intensity of the moderation effect when competition level 
decreases. The findings are in accordance with the literature that indicates that perfect markets 
is an assumption of the CVP analysis and would be wise to managers consider the market 
structure of firms’ sector when using the tool. In addition, the results points toward a firms’ 
adjustment of production considering the structure of the market that they are competing. 
Following previous researches of Brazilian market that approach the relation between DOL and 
returns, we found that ROIC and DOL are negatively related, for all sectors and independently 
of competition level. Our findings aligns with previous researches, and shows that an increase 
of operating leverage lead to worse operational performance when compared with sector mean. 
In addition of those studies findings, our study indicates the existence of a moderating impact 
of market structure on firms’ operational performance. 
Market structure is the only variable in our model that remains significant in all sectors and all 
models. The output, always with negative sign, indicates that a decrease of competitiveness 
lead to lower operational returns when compared to sector mean. This output need to be 
interpreted with caution due the characteristics of Brazilian market and proxy limitations. The 
market structure of Industry and Commerce sectors where classified as Oligopoly, with 
Services walking toward a monopoly 
Size, as control variable, shows statistical significance on model (2) for Commerce and 
Services, with greater impact on Services sector, suggesting an increase of Size importance 
when markets tend to be more concentrated. For model (3), Size is statistical significant for Full 
Sample, Industry and Services sectors, with higher impact on Services sectors. For industry 
sector, we found a positive sign for Size coefficient, with negative sign for Services. That 
indicates the importance of consider the sector characteristic when analyzing the impact of Size 
in returns.  
The addition of Size, in a double-moderation analysis, affects differently across sectors and 
within a sector. At Commerce sector, with increase of competition when compared to Services, 
Size acts as a homogenizing variable of firms’ operational results. However, in Services sector 
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the opposite effect occurs, with a detachment of the operational performance of bigger firms 
from the small firms. It highlights Size to have impact on market structure moderating role and 
that in Services sector, which have more concentration, Size is a source of advantage. The 
difference of slope between the outputs for Industry and Commerce when relationship between 
ROIC and DOL is double-moderated, aligns with the literature that Size may have different 
impacts on firms within a sector and reassure the importance of differentiate the analyses 
segmented between sectors.  
The first model being statistical significant for all sectors and groups shows a relationship 
between operational performance and costs behavior. When we compare HHI coefficient 
between sectors, we can identify that when market structure walks toward monopoly the 
explanatory capacity of model (3) increases.  Industry shows a HHI of 0.4317 and statistical 
significance for models (1) and (2) variables, except Size. Services with HHI of 0.668 shows 
significance at all models and for all variables, except DOL on model (3). Table 14 summarize 
our main findings comparing with our three hypothesis and gives an overview of the research: 
Table 14 - Research Findings 
Hypothesis Model Sector Observed Signal Findings 
H1 
There is an association between the 
Degree of Operation Leverage and 
the Operational Performance. 
1 
Full Sample - There is a negative association 
between DOL and Operational 
Performance 
Industry - 
Commerce - 
Services - 
2 
Full Sample - 
There is a negative association 
between DOL and Operational 
Performance 
Industry - 
Commerce - 
Services - 
3 
Full Sample - There is a negative association between DOL and Operational 
Performance Industry - 
Commerce   non-significant 
Services   non-significant 
H2 
The relation between operational 
return and cost behavior is 
moderated by the market structure, 
measured by market competition 
level 
3 
Full Sample   non-significant 
Industry   non-significant 
Commerce   non-significant 
Services - 
Market structure moderates the 
relationship between DOL and 
ROIC 
H3 
Market competition level 
moderation of the relationship 
between operational return and cost 
behavior is moderated by firms’ 
size. 
3 
Full Sample   non-significant 
Industry   non-significant 
Commerce - Size moderates the market 
structure moderation role 
leading to a change of signals, 
considering the sector Services + 
Source: Author 
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The results also suggest that the market structure is relevant for firms' operational performance 
by showing statistical significance for HHI as control variable for all models and sectors. 
However, moderation only occurs at markets that walks toward to a more concentrated 
structure. It suggests that when market goes toward competition, firms’ need to adjust their cost 
structure to equalize with market structure to remain efficient and competitive.  
The results also show that the double-moderation effect on the relationship between ROIC and 
DOL for Full Sample and Industry. However, at Commerce and Services sectors, Size do 
moderates the moderating effect of market structure on the relationship between ROIC and 
DOL showing different impacts between sectors and within Services sector. The outputs 
differences when segmented by sector indicates that analyze firms comparing with similar 
companies improves research quality. 
Some limitations are intrinsic to the present research results. Due the empirical characteristic, 
and as major empirical researches, the results are limited by the observed sample. As 
consequence, any inference or statement beyond the observed sample must be cautious. Our 
sample are unbalanced, and it may affect characteristics of the information. The research also 
have a survival bias, due to the exclusion of missing values. The research approach of proxies 
also takes all limitations that characterize the methodology. 
For further research, we indicate alter the sector criteria considering the production chain of 
each sector; apply Mandelker and Rhee (1984) approach of regression as a mean to measure 
the DOL; control the model by crisis, analyzing firms’ behavior during time of uncertainty; 
consider the operational cycle as moderating variable of the relationship between operational 
performance and firms’ cost behavior; include the environmental dynamism as a moderating 
variable on model, expanding the analysis of the role of market structure on the relationship 
between operational performance and firms’ costs behavior; and analyze by firm position on 
sector through firms’ HHI. 
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APPENDIX A DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 15 - Descriptive statistic of ROIC and centered ROIC 
  Stats         ROIC cROIC 
N 15729 15729 
Mean 4.109662 -3.42E-08 
p50 2.1719 -1.476338 
 
Table 16 - Descriptive statistic with outliers 
Stats   ROIC DOL HHI Size 
N 15729 13602 34730 16332 
mean -3.42E-08 0.0093955 0.2816405 0.0825714 
sd 50.58485 0.0455379 0.1837006 0.1511914 
kurtosis 10651.46 328.7573 5.865261 15.64703 
skewness 97.71135 16.61709 1.556686 3.361684 
cv -1.48E+09 4.846759 0.6522522 1.831037 
min -18.93342 0 0.0677249 0 
max 5726.832 1 0.8766502 1 
p25 -2.665781 0.0010057 0.2311875 0.006342 
p50 -1.476338 0.0020959 0.2569522 0.0256191 
p75 0.1906184 0.0065646 0.3479501 0.0834355 
 
